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Random Drug Testing 
RANDOM DRUG TESTING 
Random drug testing coexists uneasily with a general 
Fourth Amendment right to be free of suspicionless 
government searches. Typically, a governmental search is 
accompanied by a warrant supported by individualized 
suspicion, that is, probable cause. Random drug testing 
involves a search without any particularized suspicion that 
the subject of the search has used drugs. The Supreme 
Court has justified random drug testing, ruling that when 
the government has special needs to search apart from law 
enforcement, the warrant requirement does not apply and 
the only constitutional requirement is that the search be 
reasonable. Whether a search is reasonable depends on 
weighing the search's intrusion on the subject's privacy 
interest against the government's interests in the 
Via/,s used to collect urine for drug and alcohol testing. 
Seattle, Washington, April 16. 2004. The constitutionality of 
random drug testing has challenged the Supreme Court to find a 
balance between protecting citizens from unreasonable searches 
with the need to guard the general public against accidents caused 
by workers under the influence of drugs. Citing the need for public 
safery, the court has generally accepted the necessiry of random 
drug testing, despite the intrusion into an individual's right to 
privacy. RON WURZER/GETTY IMAGES 
suspicionless search. The Court has tended to approve:;_ 
random drug testing programs instigated by the govern..:: 
ment by minimizing the privacy intrusion occasioned b -':; 
th hd
•""h , y 
e searc an maxim1z1ng t e governments apparent 
interest in the suspicionless search. 
The Supreme Court has addressed random dru 
testing in various contexts, including with respect t~ 
sensitive government employment, private employment 
subject to government safety regulation, requirements to 
run for public office, and eligibility to participate in ex-
tracurricular activities in public schools. In the cases be-
fore the Court, random drug testing was used variously to 
detect drugs, to ensure the absence of drug use, or to deter 
drug use. Justifications for random drug testing have in-
cluded claims that a harm may have occurred because of 
drug use, a harm could occur as a result of drug use, or 
that drug use is incompatible with an activity engaged in 
by the group subject to testing. The Court has not 
deemed random drug testing to be subject to a specific 
test. It has relied on the general umbrella of reasonableness 
to endorse or reject a random drug testing policy. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND RANDOM 
DRUG TESTING 
The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized." The amendment applies directly to the 
federal government and indirectly to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, it applies to searches 
conducted by those acting as agents of the government or 
instruments of government policy. For example, not only 
was a railroad company's testing of employees pursuant to 
statutory command deemed a search for Fourth Ainend-
ment purposes, so was a test pursuant to the "government's 
encouragement, endorsement, and participation" (Skinner 
v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 
[1989]). However, the amendment does not apply to pri-
vate parties acting out of purely private concerns. 
The Court has consistently concluded that random 
drug tests, be they tests of blood, urine or breath, 
searches for Fourth Amendment purposes. The collection 
of the samples involves a search, as does the analysis of the 
samples. However, the Fourth Amendment only 
unreasonable searches. The Court has determined that 
amendment's suggestion that warrants supported by 
picion of wrongdoing (e.g., probable cause) are the 
ome of reasonableness is most relevant to criminal cases. 
When the government has special needs to search that 
unrelated to normal law enforcement concerns, the G<JlifL. x>.C 
dispenses with the warrant requirement. Whether such 
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suspicionlcss search is reasonable depends on the balanc-
ing of the legitimate interests of the government repre-
sented by the search with the individual's Fourth 
Amendtnent-based rights. 
GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN RANDOM 
DRUG TESTING 
The Court appears willing to find a significant government 
interests supporting random drug testing whenever the 
govern111cnt has a sensible reason to test. The issue is not 
merely whether the government has a legitimate reason to 
be concerned about drug use in a variety of circumstances. 
The issue is whether that concern can be addressed by 
allowing random drug tests when the government has no 
reason to believe that a particular person, or possibly even 
any person at all, has tal{en drugs. Given that the govern-
ment's interest in suspicionless testing must outweigh the 
intrusion on the privacy interests of the subjects, the more 
important the government's interest is deemed to be, the 
more likely the random drug testing will be allowed. 
In 1989, the Court allowed random drug testing in 
two cases. S/{inner involved federal regulations that re-
quired blood and urine tests of employees "involved in 
certain train accidents," and authorized breath and urine 
of "e1nployees who violate certain safety rules." 
regulations were pron1ulgated pursuant to the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act ofl970, in the context of an industry-
record of accidents and injuries stemming from on-
alcohol and drug use. National Treasury Employees 
'nion v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), concerned 
·quired urine tests for employees seel<lng transfer or 
·omotion to positions involving drug interdiction or 
1sitions that require that the employee carry firearms, 
<<°ough it did not appear that there was a historical 
c Joble1n of drug use involving the employees the Customs 
ice sought to test. Both cases were based on significant 
hlic safety concerns. 
In 1995 and 2002, the Court allowed random drug 
:~g in nvo publlc school cases. The Court authorized 
·ng in Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 
5), where a policy authorized random drug tests of 
:ents participating in school athletics. There, the 
'
01 district was fighting a drug problem among stu-
ts that appeared to be fueled by student athletes. Part 
_e district's concern was that when drugs and athletics 
_~d, an increased incidence of injury could occur 
\~all competitors, including those not taking drugs. 
~ourt also allowed random drug testing in Board of 
'tion of Independent School District No. 92 of Potta-
e County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). There, the 
board implemented a random drug testing policy 
;;~tudents involved in extracurricular activities based 
;>general concern regarding drug use among the 
body. The Court allowed the program based on 
Random Drug Testing 
the general concern for student health, even though there 
appeared to be no reason to believe that the group that 
was to be tested was particularly likely to have taken 
drugs. The Court simply noted that, "we find that testing 
students who participate in extracurricular activities is a 
reasonably effective means of addressing the School Dis-
trict's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring and 
detecting drug use." It appears that the policy was deemed 
reasonable in part because it helped deter all of the dis-
trict's schoolchildren from tal<lng drugs, whether they 
participated in extracurricular activity or not. 
However, the Court voided the random drug testing 
policy in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). The 
program in that case required that candidates for certain 
state offices certify that they had taken a negative urinal-
ysis test within thirty days prior to qualifying for nomi-
nation or election. The Court concluded that the 
structure of the testing indicated that it did not address a 
special need, but merely a symbolic one. That interest was 
not enough to outweigh the admittedly small privacy in-
terest that was invaded. 
RANDOM DRUG TESTING AND PRIVACY 
INTERESTS 
In approving a number of random drug testing programs, 
the Court has suggested that the privacy interests impli-
cated by random drug testing are significant. However, it 
has found those privacy interests less significant than the 
opposing governmental interests. The Court focuses on the 
reasonable expectation of privacy of the person who is being 
tested. However, in the process of evaluating the privacy 
interests, the Court arguably diminishes them. Given that 
privacy interests are balanced against government interests 
as a part of a balancing test, mini1nizing the privacy rights 
implicated will tend to lead to the approval of whatever 
random drug test is at issue. 
The Court has tended to find a general diminished 
expectation of privacy for those who are subject to ran-
dom drug tests, noting that those who are tested may have 
a diminished expectation of privacy based on the very 
activity that triggers the drug test. For example, in the 
context of evaluating the random drug testing of railroad 
workers after accidents, in Skinner, the Court indicated 
that by taking a job in a highly regulated industry, workers 
had a diminished expectation of privacy. The Court made 
a similar finding in Von Raab, because U.S. Customs 
Service workers might be involved in drug interdiction 
and could carry weapons. In addition, the Court in Acton 
and Earls indicated that student athletes and students 
involved in extracurricular activities necessarily yielded 
some of their privacy by participating in school activities 
that would expose them to situations of communal un-
dress. Nonetheless, even a lessened expectation of privacy 
may still be invaded by random dmg testing. 
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Random drug tests implicate a wide range of privacy 
interests related to the collection of samples, the analysis 
of the samples, and the dissemination of the results of the 
testing. The collection of samples for testing cai1 physi-
cally and emotionally intrude on privacy rights. The 
Court has considered the physical intrusion of breath and 
blood tests, and found them minimal. However, the 
Court has suggested that the privacy interests implicated 
by the process of collecting urine samples can be signifi-
cant, particularly given the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in excretory bodily functions. However, the Court 
suggests that if the procedures used to monitor the act of 
giving the urine sample are respectful of privacy and are 
limited to guaranteeing that no tampering has occurred, 
legitimate privacy interests will not be overwhelmingly 
invaded. Indeed, the Court has suggested that being 
monitored while producing a urine sample is similar to 
urinating while in close proximity to others-a common 
occurrence in a public bathrootn-and that privacy 
interests are not significantly implicated as long as the 
subject is fully clothed and monitored at a respectful 
distance. The Court ignored or failed to recognize a dif-
ference in privacy interests between urinating while in 
close proximity to others and being monitored while 
producing a urine sample for a drug test. 
In addition, the chemical analysis of the samples 
qualifies as an additional search that intrudes on privacy 
interests. Blood and urine can be tested for many different 
substances that can reveal significant medical information. 
Factors relevant to the reasonableness of the search in-
clude whether the testing program tests only for those 
substances that are relevant to the concerns of those who 
require the tests, whether private medical information 
must be revealed in the course of the testing, and how 
broadly test results will be disseminated. 1~he Court 
appears to conceive of the privacy right as the right not to 
have one's private medical conditions revealed, rather than 
the general right to not have one's body fluids searched. 
Given that the Court now deems a government-
ordered blood test for drugs to be a negligible invasion of 
privacy rights, it is fairly clear that the Court has sought to 
minimize the right to be free of searches. It is this mini-
mized right that is then weighed against the governments 
interest in suspicionless testing. 
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court's treatment of 
random drug testing suggests a shift in how the Fourth 
Atnendment applies to searches outside of the criminal 
context or indicates that the Court is willing to provide as 
many tools as possible for the government's fight against 
drugs. The Court has made clear that a reasonable search is 
a constitutional search and that it will determine what is 
reasonable. In judging reasonableness, the Court has cre-
ated a balancing test that weighs the random ·search's in-
trusion of privacy interests against the government's 
interest in the policy. However, it appears to have mini 
mized the apparent intrusion on privacy rights and rnaxj~. 
mized the apparent weight of government's interest iri'~ 
testing, with the result that random drug testing progr~·: 
may be fairly easy to construct in a constitutional manner. 
SEE ALSO Fourth Amendment; Privacy; Search and 
Seizure 
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RANKING THE JUSTICES 
Between 1928 and 2004, there were twelve major studies 
that proposed rankings of U.S. Supretne Court justicesi 
including those compiled by justices Charles Evans 
Hughes (1928) and Felix Frankfurter (1957) and those by 
Roscoe Pound (1938), John P. Frank (1958), 
Currie (1964), Stuart Nagel (1970), Sidney Asch 
Albert Blaustein and Roy Mersky (1972, updated 
William Ross [1996]), Bernard Schwartz (1979), James 
Hambleton (1983), Robert Bradley (2003), and 
Comiskey (2004). In his 1996 article "The Ratings 
Game," William Ross remarks that far from merely 
a parlor game, these rankings have elucidated the qual!1:1es 
of Supreme Court justices that are valued by Americans 
(p. 402). In addition to producing a list of the greatest 
justices, Bernard Schwartz also compiled a list of the ten 
worst justices, whom he calls "Supreme Court failures," 
his 1997 Book of Legal Lists. 
METHODOLOGIES 
Most of the rankings were made on the basis of each·, 
compiler's individual evaluation (Hughes 1928; Pound 
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